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United We Vote 
 
Summary 
This paper studies the advantages that a coalition of agents obtains by forming a voting 
bloc to pool their votes and cast them all together. We identify the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for an agent to benefit from the formation of the voting bloc, both 
if the agent is a member of the bloc and if the agent is not part of the bloc. We also 
determine whether individual agents prefer to participate in or step out of the bloc, and 
we find the different optimal internal voting rules that aggregate preferences within the 
coalition. 
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Despite the advantages of collaboration, alliances are often broken, groups are
dissolved, coalitions split, or they fail to be formed in the ﬁrst place. Any union
of heterogeneous agents may fail to act for the beneﬁt of some of its members.
Individual freedom of action is partially curtailed by joining a group and com-
mitting to follow its rules. This creates an incentive to abandon the group and
proceed alone in a diﬀerent course of action. There is a trade-oﬀ between the
potential gains of group action and the sacriﬁce of individual freedom involved
in group formation.
In this paper we examine this trade-oﬀ in the context of political competition
between agents who can communicate to form a coalition. We model a set of
agents who face a vote over a choice of alternatives. We assume that a speciﬁc
subset of the whole electorate can coalesce to coordinate the voting behavior
of its members. Agents coalesce to increase the probability that their preferred
outcome is chosen. For example, each country has a vote in the UN General
Assembly. The European Union’s 25 members could decide to coordinate their
foreign policies, agreeing on a common voting position before UN meetings.
A crucial problem is how to choose the common position -each country knows
what it wants and it also knows that a coalition of countries will have a better
chance of getting what it asks for than a single country. Thus there is an
incentive to form such coalition. But if its members have conﬂicting preferences,
what will the coalition stand for? If the coalition intends to act as a “voting
bloc” and cast all its votes together, it requires an internal decision-making
rule to aggregate the preferences of its members. This internal decision-making
rule will map the possibly disparate preferences of the members into a single
alternative for which all members of the coalition will vote.
The internal rule that maximizes the aggregate utility for the coalition is
simple majority. However, we ﬁnd that only under certain conditions every
member of the coalition beneﬁts from forming a voting bloc if simple majority
is chosen as the internal aggregating rule.
If all members do not beneﬁt from simple majority, then the coalition must
ﬁnd other rules to aggregate the preferences of its members. Constitutional
design studies the rules that determine how to change voting rules within a
society. In our case, we assume that the coalition of agents can form a voting
bloc to coordinate their votes only by unanimous agreement of all members.
Thus every member of the coalition must be made better oﬀ, otherwise the
coalition will not be able to function as a voting bloc, because some members
will block the project. For instance, any one country of the EU can veto a new
EU treaty that intended to unify the foreign policy of its members.
We ﬁnd that the suﬃcient conditions for a supermajority internal rule to
make every member of the coalition better oﬀ are less stringent than those
needed for simple majority to do so. We also ﬁnd that an “opt-out” rule beneﬁts
every member in some cases when supermajorities do not. Overall, for a very
large set of possible preference proﬁles there exists some rule that satisﬁes every
member in the coalition.
2Imagine a successful coalition that has found one such rule and functions as a
voting bloc, casting all its votes together according to the outcome of its internal
decision-making rule and making every member better oﬀ than if everyone voted
individually according to their own preferences. We ﬁnd that under certain
conditions some members will still have an incentive to leave the coalition (if
that is possible), thus the coalition will need more than simply to ﬁnd a rule
that beneﬁts everyone to function as a voting bloc: It will need to solve the
collective-action problem in which members prefer others but not themselves to
participate, although everyone is better oﬀ if all of them participate than if no
one does.
Several non-cooperative theories of coalition formation with economic ap-
plications are surveyed in Carraro (2003). Closer to the motivation of this
paper, Buchanan and Tullock (1962) analyze the costs and beneﬁts of forming
a coalition and praise the virtues of unanimity as internal voting rule. Barberá
and Jackson (2004) let agents choose among several rules and they deﬁne “self-
stable” voting rules as those that will not be beaten by any other rule if the
given voting rule is used to choose among rules. Maggi and Morelli’s (2003)
study “self-enforcing” rules to determine whether collective action will be taken
by a group of agents and they conclude that no other rule but simple majority
or unanimity is ever optimal.
Ad i ﬀerent approach to coalition formation comes from the voting power
literature. Gelman (2003) concentrates on the probability of casting a decisive
vote in an election and the eﬀect of coalitions over such probability. We focus
instead on the probability of getting the desired outcome out of the election and
we want to analyze the potential beneﬁts of forming a voting bloc, coalescing
with other agents to cast all votes in the same direction.
W ea r ei n t e r e s t e di nt h ee ﬀect of a single coalition that forms a voting bloc on
the degree of satisfaction of its members, how the heterogeneity of such members
may aﬀect their gain in utility and which internal voting rules in the coalition
may make the voting bloc satisfactory for a broader range of parameters.
These theoretical questions are particularly relevant to the ongoing debates
about the need or desire for a common foreign policy in the EU, a purpose
that was ﬁrst vaguely stated in the Maastricht Treaty (1992)1, but that has
been recently the subject of much deeper debates and controversy during the
negotiations towards a constitution (started in 2002) and will probably continue
to be in the European political agenda for years to come. Therefore, we will
frequently refer to the EU as a motivating example along our exposition.
After introducing the model and showing that there is a surplus to be gained
by forming a voting bloc in Section 2, in Section 3 we ask whether the formation
of the voting bloc will beneﬁt every member of the coalition. In Section 4 we
study an “opt-out” rule that allows one agent to stay out of the voting bloc
and discuss under what conditions introducing such a rule will beneﬁta l lt h e
members of the coalition. In Section 5 we conclude and propose a future agenda
of research. Algebraic calculations andp r o o f sa r el o c a t e di nt h eA p p e n d i x .
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32 The Model. Gains from forming a Voting Bloc
We consider a society formed by M + N +1agents, where M and N are even.
These agents (legislators, countries, etc.) face a binary decision: either to keep
the status quo, or to vote for an alternative a to replace it. All agents are called
to vote either for a (yes), or against a (no). If the number of favorable votes is
equal or higher than a threshold T, then a is implemented.
Each agent strictly prefers either the status quo or the alternative a, and
we assume no intensity in preferences. Preferences over lotteries will simply be
determined in favor of the lottery that assigns the higher weight to the preferred
alternative.
M agents lack coordination powers and will vote individually. The remaining
N +1agents can coordinate among themselves and may at wish form a voting
bloc. We will call this set of agents the coalition C.
If each of its members agrees, coalition C forms a voting bloc. In this case
coalition C will hold an internal meeting to predetermine its voting behavior in
the general vote. In the internal meeting, all members of the coalition will vote
yes or no according to their preferences for or against a. Then:
1. If the majority in this internal vote has strictly more than t(N +1)votes,
where t ∈ [1
2, N
N+1], then the majority prevails and all members of coalition C
will vote as a bloc in the general election casting N +1v o t e sa c c o r d i n gt ot h e
preferences (either yes or no) of the majority of the coalition. The outcome of
the coalitional internal meeting is binding.
2. If the majority gathers no more than t(N +1 )votes in the internal vote,
then the coalition fails to act as a bloc in the general election and all members
are free to vote according to their individual preferences.
Note that threshold t deﬁnes the t − majority rule used by the coalition
to decide whether or not it will act as a bloc rolling its internal minorities. A
threshold t ∈ [1
2, 1
2 + 1




to a supermajority and t = N
N+1 to unanimity.
Forming a voting bloc with unanimity as internal voting rule is in essence
identical to not forming a voting bloc, because the coalition will only cast its
votes as a bloc if all its members share the same preference, in which case all
votes will be cast as they would in the absence of a voting bloc.
If the coalition does not form a voting bloc, then all the members of the
coalition will vote according to their individual preferences in the general elec-
tion.
Coalition members decide to form a voting bloc with a t−majority internal
voting rule before the alternative a is speciﬁed, so agents do not know if they
will prefer alternative a or the status quo. Agents have no power over the
speciﬁcation of alternative a, which is exogenous.
Every agent i has a type pi, which is the probability that agent i will prefer
alternative a to the status quo, once alternative a is revealed.2 This type can
2This probabilistic model of voter uncertainty was ﬁrst considered by Rae (1969) and
developed by Badger (1972) and Curtis (1972).
4be interpreted as a propensity for change, or as a displeasure with the status
quo in general. Let p−i denote the vector of types of all agents in the society
other than i. Types are common knowledge, and so are true preferences once
agents learn what the alternative a is.
Each realization of preferences is independent from the others. Once alter-
native a is revealed, each of possibly many agents with a type po has an inde-
pendent probability po of supporting alternative a. Typically several of them
will end up supporting a, whereas some others will prefer the status quo.
If the coalition forms a voting bloc, in the internal vote, voting will be sincere
and there will be no abstention. With simple majority as the internal decision
making rule, if the number of yes votes surpasses the number of negative ones,
then the whole coalition (now a voting bloc) will cast a total of (N+1)yes votes
in the general vote which includes all agents in the society. If the number of
no votes surpasses the number of favorable ones, then the coalition accordingly
votes as a bloc casting (N +1 )no votes in the general vote.
The voting bloc behavior we have described consists of rolling internal mi-
norities to present a common front in the general vote, strengthening the posi-
tion of the coalition’s majority with the minority votes which are “converted”
or “swayed” to the majoritarian camp, increasing the chances of eventually get-
ting the outcome the majority wishes (of course, in doing so the probability of
getting what the minority wishes decreases).
Proposition 1 Let type pi ∈ (0,1) for each agent i in the society. Then, for
any N ≥ 2 (number of agents in the coalition),M≥ 2 (number of agents not
in the coalition), and T (threshold to accept alternative a), a coalition of N +1
members strictly increases the sum of expected utilities of its members by forming
a voting bloc with either simple majority or any supermajority as the internal
voting rule. Simple majority rule is the internal voting rule that maximizes sum
of expected utilities of the members of the voting bloc.
The proof is straightforward. We oﬀer a sketch here and details in the
Appendix.
Forming a voting bloc only has an eﬀect in utilities if the formation of a
bloc and the subsequent rolling of minority votes within the coalition alters the
outcome of the general vote. If so, every member of the coalition who is in
the coalitional majority beneﬁts from the voting bloc formation, at the cost of
every voter in the minority. Since the majority is by deﬁnition bigger than the
minority, there are more members beneﬁting than suﬀering from the bloc, and
since the intensity of preferences is set to be equal for every member, in the
aggregate forming a voting bloc generates a surplus of utility for the coalition.
Any other rule that in some cases fails to roll a minority is giving away this net
gain in utility and therefore underperforms in comparison to simple majority in
terms of aggregated gains in utility.3
3The optimality of simple majority as the aggregation rule for a set of agents is proved by
Curtis (1972).
5It follows from Proposition 1 that if all the members of the coalition share a
common type, then forming a voting bloc increases the utility of every member
in the coalition. Therefore, a homogeneous coalition of agents who have the
same type should always form a voting bloc with simple majority as the internal
voting rule to maximize their probability of winning the ﬁnal vote in a larger
electorate. Also from Proposition 1, we derive the following corollary:
Corollary 1 If all but one of the members of the coalition share a common
type, all the homogeneous members beneﬁt from the formation of a voting bloc.
Suppose all members in C except for i share a common type. Then if member
i is in the rolled minority, more of the homogeneous members are in the majority
beneﬁting from the rolling of votes the voting bloc imposes than in the hurt
minority, thus in the aggregate the homogeneous members strictly beneﬁtf r o m
the bloc. If member i is in the majority, there are at least the same number of
homogeneous members in the majority as in the minority. Thus, in the aggregate
the bloc is at worst neutral to the homogeneous members. Since both cases are
possible, overall there is a surplus for the homogeneous members (maybe not so
for the heterogeneous one).
In Sections 3 and 4 we will show under which conditions will every member
of an heterogeneous coalition beneﬁt from the formation of a voting bloc. We
now ask whether the formation of a voting bloc beneﬁts or harms the interests
of the agents who are not part of the coalition. The answer will depend on the
voting rule in the general election.
If the rule in the general election is unanimity, then each agent has a veto
power over changes to the status quo. If a coalition forms a voting bloc, it
removes the veto power from its members, but not from non-members, who
therefore beneﬁt from the formation of a voting bloc by the coalition. If the
rule in the general election is simple majority, a voting bloc will only change the
outcome to make a minority win. That is contrary to the interests of a majority
of non-members of the coalition.
Proposition 2 Let type pi ∈ (0,1) for each agent i in the society and let coali-
tion C form a voting bloc with any internal rule other than unanimity. Then,
if the voting rule in the general election is unanimity, every agent not in the
coalition strictly beneﬁts from the formation of the voting bloc. If the general
voting rule is simple majority, there is a loss in aggregate utility for the agents
not in the coalition and the society as a whole.
We provide the proofs for every proposition in the Appendix.
Even if the formation of a voting bloc is in the aggregate hurting non-
members of the coalition, this eﬀect will in general not be uniform. Some agents
not in the coalition will win, whereas some lose expected utility if the coalition
forms a voting bloc. For instance, suppose that the members of the coalition
have types such that almost always the yes wins in the coalitional internal vote
and a small but signiﬁcant no minority is rolled. Then the bloc behavior by the
coalition tilts the general vote in favor of alternative a. Agents with a high type,
6who are likely to prefer alternative a, will be then happy to see the coalition
form a voting bloc. Of course, the behavior of the voting bloc hurts those with
a lower type in our example.
To summarize, forming a voting bloc is inconsequential if the coalition uses
unanimity as internal voting rule, but with any other rule, forming a bloc gives a
surplus in utility to the coalition and simple majority is the internal voting rule
that maximizes such surplus. Every agent in the rest of the society beneﬁts from
the formation of a bloc by the coalition if the general voting rule is unanimity,
but if the general voting rule is simple majority these agents suﬀer an aggregate
loss in utility, although some of them may still beneﬁt from the formation of a
voting bloc by the coalition.
In the next section we investigate under what conditions the coalition can
reach unanimous agreement among its members to proceed with the formation
of a voting bloc and appropriate the surplus in utility that comes with the voting
bloc.
3 Achieving consensus to form a Voting Bloc
We wish to ﬁnd an internal rule for the coalition to aggregate preferences in
such a way that maximizes the aggregate utility of its members relative to a
default in which the coalition uses unanimity as internal voting rule and all
members always vote according to their true preferences in the general election.
This internal rule must be such that in expectation every member prefers it
to unanimity. Because each member of the coalition can block deviations from
unanimity as internal voting rule, the coalition needs full consensus to use any
other rule to aggregate its preferences.
G i v e na ni n t e r n a lv o t i n gr u l ev, we say that v is beneﬁcial for C if in ex-
pectation every member in C is weakly better oﬀ using v rather than unanimity
as the internal voting rule and some member in C is strictly better oﬀ.
In short, a rule is beneﬁcial for the coalition if it beneﬁts all its members to
adopt it instead of unanimity.
In this section we assume that the general election rule is simple majority
and we investigate which t − majority internal rules are beneﬁcial for C. If
there are several beneﬁcial majority rules, we focus on whichever one maximizes
the overall surplus for the coalition. We recall from Proposition 1 that the
internal voting rule that maximizes the aggregated utility for the coalition is
simple majority. However, in an heterogeneous coalition, some members may
not beneﬁt from pooling votes in a voting bloc with simple majority.
We label unanimity rule as ∅ as a reminder that using unanimity as internal
voting rule is identical to not forming a voting bloc, or no members joining the
voting bloc.
We label as t a t − majority rule in which every member of the coalition
participates in the voting bloc, and minorities of size strictly less than t(N +1)
are rolled to join the position of the majority of the coalition in the general vote.
Simple majority, denoted Sm, refers to the special case in which t = 1
2.
7For any internal voting rule v,w el e tEUi[v] denote the expected utility for
agent i if the coalition forms a voting bloc with v as internal voting rule.
Before presenting our results, we need to make some assumptions on the
types of the agents:
Assumption 1 The number of favorable votes cast by the M agents not in
coalition C follows a symmetric distribution around M
2 with some positive prob-
ability of casting a quantity of favorable votes diﬀerent than M
2 .
This condition signiﬁcantly relaxes the standard assumption in the voting
power literature that all agents have a common type of 0.5.4 Instead, it suﬃces
for our model that the M agents can be paired in such way that for each pair
(j,j0), pj + pj0 =1 , with at least one pair of agents with types strictly between
zero and one. We let f (x) denote the probability that the M members cast
exactly x favorable votes for alternative a,a n dw el e tF(x)=
Px
k=0 f(k) be the
distribution function of the number of favorable votes cast by the M agents not
in the coalition.
We make a milder assumption on the types of the members of coalition C.
Namely, we assume that coalition C “leans towards” accepting alternative a. Let
gij(x) denote the probability that x members of C\{i,j}, the coalition without
i or j, prefer alternative a. Then we require the following:
Assumption 2 For all k ∈ [0, N
2 − 1] and for all i,j ∈ C, gij(N
2 + k) >
gij(N










Assumption 2 states that given any N−1 members of the coalition and given
any particular majority-minority split of votes in this subset of the coalition, it
is more probable that this majority in the subset is for the yes side. As u ﬃcient
condition for our assumption to hold is that excluding any three members, we
can pair the rest in such a way that for each pair (i,i0), pi +pi0 ≥ 1 and at least
one pair is diﬀerent from (0.5,0.5).
Let gi(x) denote the probability that exactly x members of C\i, the coalition









From Assumption 2 it follows that for all k ∈ [1, N
2 ] and for all i ∈ C, gi(N
2 +k) >
gi(N
2 − k). We show this in the Appendix.
With these two assumptions on the types of the agents and simple majority
as the voting rule in the general election, we ﬁnd that a member of the coalition
w i l ll i k et of o r mav o t i n gb l o cw i t hat − majority rule as internal voting rule
if her type is “high enough”: If a given member would beneﬁtf r o mf o r m i n ga
voting bloc with a t − majority, then every other member with a higher type
would beneﬁte v e nf u r t h e r .
4See, for instance, Gelman (2003).
8Lemma 1 Let l,h ∈ C such that ph ≥ pl. Then EUh[t] − EUh[∅] ≥ EUl[t] −
EUl[∅].
By Lemma 1 we can focus only on the member with the lowest type to see
if she beneﬁts from the formation of a voting bloc with a t − majority.I fs h e
does, then every member in the coalition beneﬁts from forming a voting bloc
with a t − majority rule:
Proposition 3 Let l ∈ C be the member with the lowest type. Then a t −
majority rule is beneﬁcial as an internal voting rule for coalition C if and
only if pl >p
t,∅
l (p−l).
In the Appendix we ﬁnd the exact expression of p
t,∅
l (p−l) as a function of
the types of the agents and the threshold t.
Since the coalition “leans” towards accepting alternative a, the majority
within the coalition will be in favor of alternative a m o r eo f t e nt h a nn o t ,w i t ht h e
result that the negative votes will be rolled more often than the favorable ones.
Therefore it becomes more likely that alternative a wins the general election.
Member l only likes such voting behavior if her type is high “enough”, where
the exact meaning of “enough” is given by the threshold in the Proposition.
The threshold p
t,∅
l (p−l) converges to 1 as every type pi,i∈ C\l converges to
1. On the other hand as gl(N
2 +k)−gl(N
2 −k) converges to zero (as the distri-
bution of votes by the other members of the coalition converges to a symmetric
distribution), the threshold p
t,∅
l (p−l) converges to −∞. A threshold below zero
indicates that member l supports the creation of a voting bloc regardless of her
own type.
We illustrate Proposition 3 with the aid of Figure 1, for the speciﬁcc a s eo f
simple majority as the internal voting rule.
To be able to plot the threshold p
Sm,∅
l (p−l) with respect to only one variable,
we assume that the distribution of votes by the agents not in coalition C follows
a binomial Bi(M, 1
2) and that all the members of coalition C except l share
ac o m m o nt y p er. A single parameter r is suﬃcient (captures all the relevant
information about the types of the rest of members of C) to determine if member
l would beneﬁt from the formation of a voting bloc: For any heterogeneous
coalition in which all other members except l did not share a common type, that
coalition is mapped to one particular value of r such that l evaluates coalition C
as if all the other members had a common type r. Therefore, Figure 1 indirectly
captures all possible coalitions of size N. In Figure 1 we set M = 176 and
N =2 4to approximate our European Union example. We will use these values
in most of our ﬁgures.
Our model corresponds to the right half the graph: if the common type r
of the N members other than l is bigger than one half, member l will support
the formation of a voting bloc with simple majority if the type pl is above the
depicted threshold. The left half of the picture is a symmetric case in which
the coalition leans towards rejecting a. Then member l will only support the
formation of a bloc if her type is below the threshold.













Figure 1: Consensus to form a voting bloc with simple majority
The following proposition tells us that some coalitions that can’t form a vot-
ing bloc with simple majority, can form a voting bloc with some supermajority
rule in such a way that every member’s utility increases.
The threshold function p
t,∅
l (p−l) is decreasing in t. As the parameter t used
for the t−majority internal rule increases, the more type proﬁles for which the
t − majority is beneﬁcial for coalition C:
Proposition 4 Let t0 = t + 1
N+1. Then for any t ∈ [1
2, N−1
N+1), the subset of
type proﬁles for which a t0 −majority is beneﬁcial for C strictly contains the
subset of type proﬁles for which a t − majority rule is beneﬁcial for C.
The more stringent the supermajority rule the coalition uses, the lower that
the type of member l can be and yet allow l to beneﬁt from the formation of a
voting bloc with the t − majority internal voting rule.
We depict this result in Figure 2 for N =2 4 ,M= 176,Fis a binomial
Bi(M, 1
2) and every member of C except for l has a type r>1
2. Figure 2
presents four possible rules for a coalition the size of the EU: Simple majority,
two-thirds majority, four-ﬁfths majority, and nine-tenths majority.
We see how the range of parameters for which a voting bloc would bene-
ﬁt every member increases as the supermajority rule becomes more stringent.
However, since simple majority maximizes the overall surplus for the coalition,
setting higher thresholds for approval of a common position diminishes the value
of the voting bloc, although it may help to bring an outlier on board.
Aiming to maximize the utility of the coalition subject to not hurting any
member, the optimizing solution is the lowest possible supermajority that would
beneﬁt (or at least leave indiﬀerent) the member with the lowest type. A con-
sequence of Proposition 4 is that for any t0 ∈ [1
2, N−1
N+1) there exists a proﬁle of
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Figure 2: Supermajority rules
types such that t0 maximizes the surplus for the coalition among the class of
beneﬁcial t − majority rules.
In the remainder of this section we investigate how changes in the size of
the coalition or the heterogeneity of types of its members aﬀect which rules the
coalition will be able to use to the beneﬁt of all its members.
We ﬁnd that if the size of the coalition is too large, then no coalition in
which all members but l share a common type r>p l can form a voting bloc
with simple majority.
Proposition 5 Let M be ﬁxed. Let pl <rfor l ∈ C and pi = r for all
i ∈ C\{l}. There exists some N such that if N>N, simple majority is not
beneﬁcial for C.
As the coalition becomes very large relative to M, the internal majority
coincides with the external majority unless the coalition is almost evenly split.
The coalition is more likely to vote for a than against a. Since member l is the
member with the lowest type, conditional on the coalition being evenly split,
member l is more likely to be against a, thus on the losing side. Therefore, if the
coalition becomes so large that rolling its votes only aﬀects the outcome when
the coalition is almost evenly split, the member with the lowest type rejects the
formation of a bloc with simple majority. In the limit, only a fully homogeneous
coalition where every member has the same type could form a voting bloc with
simple majority.
Figure 3 shows the convergence of the threshold p
Sm,∅
l (r,N) to r as N gets
large, given that F is a binomial Bi(M, 1
2), M =6 0and pi = r ∀i ∈ C\l. The
















Figure 3: Convergence of p
Sm,∅
l (r,N) to r in a dichotomous coalition.
three plots (from bottom to top) correspond to a common value r =0 .6 (we
show the convergence asymptote as well), a common value 0.85 and a common
value 0.95 for the N members minus l in the coalition.
Beyond size, we ask how heterogeneity aﬀects the chances of a coalition
forming a voting bloc. We know that simple majority is beneﬁcial for any
homogeneous coalition, whereas heterogeneous coalitions may run into obstacles.
Nevertheless, we show by means of an example that the possibility of forming
a voting bloc with simple majority is not monotonic with heterogeneity.
W ec o m p a r et h r e ec o a l i t i o n sw i t ht h es a m em e a nt y p ea n dt h es a m el o w e s t
type. We measure heterogeneity by the standard deviation of types. We ﬁnd
that the most homogeneous and the least homogeneous of the three coalitions
cannot form a voting bloc with simple majority, whereas the intermediate one
can.
Example 1 L e ta l la g e n t sn o ti nC have a type pm =0 .5 and let there be 10 of
them.
Let C1 be a coalition of agents with types {0.445, 0.75, 0.75, 0.75, 0.75}.
The mean type is 0.689. The standard deviation 0.1368. If C = C1, then
p
Sm,∅
l (p−l)=0 .4943 and l rejects the formation of a voting bloc with simple
majority as internal voting rule.
Let C2 be another coalition of agents with types {0.445, 0.5, 0.5, 1, 1}, mean
type 0.689, standard deviation 0.2847. If C = C2, then p
Sm,∅
l (p−l)=0 .441 so
forming a voting bloc with simple majority beneﬁts every member of the coalition.
Let C3 be yet another coalition of agents with types {0.445, 0.45, 0.55, 1,
1}, mean type 0.689, standard deviation 0.2869. If C = C3, then p
Sm,∅
l (p−l)
=0 .446 so once again member l vetoes the formation of a voting bloc with simple
12majority.
For coalitions C1 and C3 in Example 1, using a two-thirds majority or a
three-quarters majority (or any other value of t that requires a majority of 4 to
1 to roll the minority) every member beneﬁt sf r o mf o r m i n gav o t i n gb l o c .I nC1,
using t =3 /4,p
3/4,∅
l (p−l)=0 .39 so member l favors the formation of a voting
bloc that rolls only minorities of size one. Similar results hold for coalition C3.
Considering coalition C1 in Example 1, we quantify the impact that the
formation of a voting bloc would have over the outcome in the general election.
We show the results in Table 1. The numbers represent the probability that the
event indicated in each row occurs, given the internal rule the coalition uses. In
the second column, the coalition uses unanimity or forms no bloc, in the third
column it forms a bloc with simple majority and in the fourth column it uses a
3/4 majority.
TABLE 1 No bloc 1/2 maj 3/4 maj
a approved 69.52% 79.58% 73.45%
a approved given l likes a 79.82% 90.00% 84.72%
a approved given l dislikes a 61.26% 71.22% 64.42%
l satisﬁed with outcome 57.02% 56.02% 57.44%
j ∈ C\l satisﬁed with outcome 67.26% 74.70% 70.57%
m/ ∈ C satisﬁed with outcome 59.44% 53.51% 57.61%
Since the coalition leans towards a, forming a voting bloc makes approval
of a more likely. All the members except for l beneﬁt and all non-members are
h u r tf o r m i n gav o t i n gb l o c .M e m b e rl is hurt if simple majority is used, so in
order to beneﬁt all its members, the coalition has to select a supermajority that
makes l better oﬀ, but attenuates the advantage for all the other members. We
see that forming a voting bloc with simple majority would have a substantial
impact: the probability of approving a increases ten percentage points and the
probability of getting the desired outcome out of the election would increase
seven percentage points for all members of coalition C1 but l. Using a 3/4
majority reduces this beneﬁt of a voting bloc to roughly a half, but it makes all
members of C1 more likely to see their preference prevail in the general election.
In this section we have described the necessary and suﬃcient condition for
a coalition to be able to form a voting bloc with a majority rule. We show
that although simple majority always maximizes the aggregate surplus, there
are type proﬁles for which simple majority is not beneﬁcial for the coalition but
some supermajority rules are and the coalition can choose one of them to gain
some of the surplus of a voting bloc beneﬁting all its members.
4 An Opt-Out rule
In this section we explore a more nuanced rule, which consists of forming a
voting bloc with all but one of the members of the coalition. The excluded
member does not participate in the internal vote of the voting bloc, but votes
directly and according to her true preferences in the general election.
13This scheme diﬀers from expelling one member from the coalition in a crucial
detail: The exclusion is voluntary, the member who does not participate in the
voting bloc agrees to the formation of the voting bloc without her, and hence she
opts to be out, or “opts-out”. The member who opts-out has to beneﬁtf r o m
the formation of the voting bloc by the other members, otherwise she would
rather veto the whole project and keep unanimity in place as the voting rule to
aggregate votes in the coalition.5
We denote by Out the “Opt-Out for l”r u l ei nw h i c ht h em e m b e rl with the
lowest type does not participate in the voting bloc which is formed by every
other member of the coalition and simple majority is chosen as internal voting
rule.6
Throughout this section we assume that the general election rule is simple
majority.
Our ﬁrst result on opt-out rules considers under the conditions under which
the member of the coalition who stays out of the voting bloc beneﬁts from its
formation.
Proposition 6 The formation of a voting bloc with simple majority rule by




We provide the expression of p
Out,∅
l (p−l) in the Appendix.
The threshold function p
Out,∅
l (p−l) is always positive given our assumptions
on types; it is not increasing with respect to the type of all other members of
the coalition and it does not always converge to one as the types of the members
of the coalition do. This last feature guarantees that in some cases in which
member l rejects forming a voting bloc with simple majority she beneﬁts from
the formation of a bloc with an "Opt-Out for l" rule. If all the other members
also beneﬁt from the “Opt-Out for l” rule, then this rule is beneﬁcial for C and
it oﬀers a solution for a coalition which couldn’t form a bloc with t−majority
rules. The next Proposition states this result.
Proposition 7 If 4 ≤ N ≤ M, there exist type proﬁles for which an “Opt-Out
for l”i n t e r n a lv o t i n gr u l ei sbeneﬁcial for C and no t − majority rule is.
If N =2or N>M ,t h e r ee x i s t sn ot y p ep r o ﬁle for which “Opt-Out for l”i s
beneﬁcial for C and simple majority is not.
If N =2 , a l l o w i n go n em e m b e rt os t e p - o u tr e d u c e st h eb l o ct os i z et w o ,
which is identical to not forming a bloc at all, or forming it with unanimity. If
5Famous opt-outs in the European Union include the UK and Denmark with regards to
the European Monetary Union: Their approval to the Maastricht Treaty was necessary for
the monetary union to bring about the euro, and they supported the implementation of the
treaty, whilst staying out of the project. If they had deemed it harmful to their interests, they
could have refused to sign it.
6We could extend the results in this section to consider opting-out rules in which l stayed
out and the participating members chose a supermajority as internal voting rule, but for
simplicity we focus on the rule that will maximize the surplus for the members who participate
in the bloc given that l will not join them.
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Figure 4: An Opt-Out rule as a solution
N>M ,then the coalition acts as a dictator even if one member opts-out, thus
the member who opts-out cannot be better oﬀ out of the voting bloc than in
the voting bloc.
We use Figure 4 to gain some insight about the threshold p
Out,∅
l (p−l) and its
comparison with p
Sm,∅
l (p−l).A si na l lﬁgures, we assume that the distribution
of votes by the agents not in coalition C is a binomial distribution Bi(M, 1
2)
and that all the members of coalition C except l share a common type r. We
set M = 176 and N =2 4 .
L o o k i n ga tF i g u r e4 ,w en o t i c et h a ti ft y p e sa r ei nt h ea r e ab e l o wt h et h r e s h -
old p
Sm,∅
l (p−l) and above p
Out,∅
l (p−l),lw o u l dv e t of o r m i n gav o t i n gb l o cw i t h
simple majority if it included all the members. By allowing l to stay out, the
coalition can form a voting bloc with simple majority with every other member
and in expectation raise the utility of every member including l.
This result casts a favorable light over “opt-out” rules. On the other hand,
“opt-out” rules have two setbacks: If the coalition is heterogeneous (and not
just dichotomous with all members but l sharing a common type) and l opts out,
it is possible that the member with the next lowest type opposes the formation
of the reduced bloc. Allowing this member to opt-out as well may simply pass
the problem to the next member until the bloc fully unravels and every member
but the last two opt-out, which negates the purpose of a voting bloc.
Even if this unravelling does not take place, there is a second latent compli-
cation to opt-out rules: if the coalition allows for the member with the lowest
type to opt-out, then other members may also request to opt-out, even if they
beneﬁt from the formation of a voting bloc, simply because they would beneﬁt
even more by opting-out. If the coalition lets every member join in or stay out of
the voting bloc, then it faces a “free-rider” problem, where some members who
15would beneﬁt from joining the voting bloc, may prefer to opt-out and passively
take advantage of the pooling of votes by other coalition partners. From our
concept of free-riding we exclude situations in which a member opts-out of a
voting bloc and beneﬁts from the pooling of votes by the other members if the
member who opts-out would be hurt by a voting bloc that included him.
Deﬁnition 1 Member l “free-rides” if she would have beneﬁtted from forming
and participating in a voting bloc, but beneﬁts even more as a result of opting-
out.
With no opt-out rules, there is no chance to free-ride, since the coalition faces
an “all-or-none” binary decision: either every member joins the voting bloc, or
the bloc is not formed. If instead members can individually choose whether
to join in or to stay out, some may not choose to join in. In the following
Proposition we explore whether a member would prefer to participate in or to
stay out of a voting bloc formed by every other member of the coalition.
Proposition 8 Member l prefers to participate in a voting bloc formed by the
coalition with simple majority as internal decision rule better than to opt-out
and not participate in the pooling of votes by the rest of the members of the
coalition if and only if pl >p
Sm,Out
l (p−l).
We provide the exact expression of p
Sm,Out
l (p−l) in the Appendix.
From Proposition 3 we obtained the condition for l to beneﬁtf r o mf o r m i n g
and participating in a voting bloc with simple majority. Proposition 8 now states
when will member l prefer to opt-out from such a bloc. Combining Propositions
3 and 8 we obtain Proposition 9, which demonstrates the downside of opt-out
rules: They create a free-riding problem when member l would beneﬁtf r o m
participating in the bloc but prefers to opt-out.
Proposition 9 An "Opt-Out for l"r u l ec r e a t e saf r e e - r i d e rp r o b l e mi fa n do n l y
if p
Sm,∅
l (p−l) <p l <p
Sm,Out
l (p−l). If 4 ≤ N ≤ M, there exist type proﬁles for
which this condition is met. If N =2or N>M ,this condition cannot hold
and free-riding cannot occur.
If pl <p
Sm,Out
l (p−l), member l prefers not to participate in the voting bloc
and she free-rides if participating would be better for l than not forming a voting
bloc.
When member l compares the utility of being in the bloc to the utility of
being out of the bloc, she compares the probability of aﬀecting the general
outcome such that it coincides with her wishes when she votes directly in the
general election, to the same probability when she is voting through the voting
bloc.
This analysis of the utility of being in or out of a voting bloc bears some
resemblance, but is not equivalent, to the comparison of probabilities of being
decisive (of being pivotal in the ﬁnal outcome) that occupy the voting power















Figure 5: Opt-out and free-ride
literature. In a nutshell, in the voting power literature the agents seek to maxi-
mize their probability of being able to alter the outcome, whereas in our model
they only care to alter the outcome towards their preference:
Suppose an agent can change the outcome against his preference by joining a
voting bloc and casting a vote against his preference, whereas if he stays out of
the bloc his vote is irrelevant. Then in our model this agent is indiﬀerent between
being out of the bloc and being irrelevant but getting the desired outcome, or
being in the bloc and being crucial to obtain the desired outcome.7
Let us visualize when a member will prefer to opt-out and free-ride on her
coalition partners with the aid of Figure 5, where again N =2 4 ,M= 176,t h e
24 members other than l in coalition C share a common type r and the number
of favorable votes by agents not in the coalition follows a binomial Bi(M, 1
2).
If type pl is above p
Sm,∅
l (p−l) but below p
Sm,Out
l (p−l), member l would have
supported a voting bloc with simple majority and no opt-outs better than no
bloc, but she prefers to opt-out if she can. If she opts-out, the overall utility for
the coalition is reduced.
If any member can opt-out, then coalitions of size less than M face an even
worse problem: for some conﬁgurations of types all members would prefer to
opt-out. If N>M ,then the coalition forming a voting bloc is a dictator and
thus votes of agents not in the voting bloc do not count and no member can
gain from opting-out.
A sas u m m a r y ,a l l o w i n gam e m b e rt oo p t - o u tc a nb eag o o ds o l u t i o ni na
coalition with great homogeneity of types and one outlier, but in many other
7For a rigorous study of the relation and diﬀerences between voting power and probability
of success or satisfaction (the approach we take), we recommend Laruelle and Valenciano
(2005).
17instances it can generate free-rider problems, which are aggravated if the possi-
bility to opt-out is extended to every member.
5C o n c l u s i o n s a n d E x t e n s i o n s
A coalition of agents who are a part of a larger electorate or assembly facing a
vote may choose to form a voting bloc. The coalition will then pool its votes and
cast them all together according to the outcome of an internal vote. We have
shown that forming a voting bloc generates a surplus in the aggregate utility of
the members of the coalition and we have checked that simple majority is the
internal rule for the voting bloc that maximizes such surplus.
However, if there is heterogeneity among the members of the coalition, the
surplus will not be evenly shared. In the absence of transfers, the formation of
a voting bloc may be detrimental to some members of the coalition. Ordering
members from “least likely” to “most likely” to support changes to the status
quo, we ﬁnd a single cutting point or threshold separating those members of the
coalition who support the formation of a voting bloc, and those who reject it.
This implies that either every agent in the coalition supports the voting bloc, or
at most, agents at one tail of the distribution of types reject it. It will never be
the case that extremists from both tails reject the formation of a voting bloc.
We ﬁnd it interesting to compare this result with a diﬀerent model of fed-
eralism, by Crémer and Palfrey (1996) and (1999). Crémer and Palfrey argue
that moderate voters, with preferences closer to the median of the Union, will
advocate federalism and uniﬁed policies. Complementing their work, our pa-
per provides a rationale for at least one set of extreme voters to wish for a
common foreign policy: Suppose the binary choice is between the status quo
and “change” and forming a voting bloc the aggregate vote for the whole coali-
tion will most likely be “change”. Then voters within each country who want
“change” see a better chance of getting it through a uniﬁed federal government.
Under the motivation that each member of the coalition can veto the forma-
tion of any kind of voting bloc, we have analyzed possible solutions to achieve
unanimous support by all members of the coalition to proceed with some form of
voting bloc when some member of the coalition opposes the solution which max-
imizes the total surplus of utility (a voting bloc formed by the whole coalition
with simple majority as internal decision rule).
Using qualiﬁed majority rules (supermajorities) as the internal voting rules
reduces the overall surplus in aggregate utility but it makes it easier to achieve
unanimous support for the formation of a voting bloc: the higher the threshold
of the qualiﬁed majority rule, the less likely that any agent would be hurt by
the formation of a bloc. This result contrasts with the ﬁndings of Maggi and
Morelli’s model (2003), in which only simple majority or unanimity are ever
found to be optimal, but their focus is on homogeneous agents.
In the last section we have considered another solution: for some range of
parameters, allowing an extreme agent who opposes the formation of a voting
bloc to opt-out and not participate in the bloc is suﬃcient to achieve unani-
18mous support (including support by the member who chooses to opt-out) for
the formation of a voting bloc by the rest of the coalition. Though it may look
strange to require an agent that does not participate in the bloc to acquiesce to
its formation, we think the salient example of the EU (where each country has
a veto power over changes on fundamental treaties and thus can stop an initia-
tive regardless of whether it includes or excludes the vetoing country) provides
enough motivation for the relevance of this result.
Our theoretical results have practical implications, suggesting that a col-
lection of countries with some similarity in their policy preferences would do
better by forging a common foreign policy that was not based in unanimity. In
particular, each of the 25 members of the EU would be more likely to see its
preference prevail at a UN Assembly meeting (or at any international forum
that grants one vote per country) if the Union ﬁrst pre-determined how it will
cast all its 25 votes according to an internal voting rule that rolled minorities
within the EU.
We could extend this model to incorporate decision costs of forming a voting
bloc, making it harder to achieve unanimous support for the voting bloc. Alter-
natively, we could envision a more favorable setting for voting blocs considering
economies of scale. The joint expression of will by a united coalition may wield
more power in the general electorate than the individual sum of the votes of
the coalition members. That is diﬃcult to justify in terms of votes, but is much
more reasonable if lobbying, exerting political pressure or otherwise inﬂuenc-
ing others are parts of the actions that come with voting in one or the other
direction.
Another extension within the framework of the model would be to consider
correlation in the realization of the preferences of the members of the coalition,
possibly through a correlation matrix. A way to partially incorporate correlation
without adding too substantial complications would be to deﬁne a “leader of
the coalition” and then let the type of every other agent be a two-dimensional
vector with the probability of supporting the alternative if the leader does and
if the leader does not support the alternative.
A more ambitious extension that we think deserves future research consists
on allowing several coalitions, not just one, to form voting blocs. Ideally, any
subset of agents would be allowed to form a voting bloc and we would look
for stable partitions of the space of agents into voting blocs. We ﬁnd strong
justiﬁcation for our assumption of a single coalition by considering the formation
of a voting bloc in the case of international relations, where the 25 countries
in the EU participate in a project that is to a large extent unique. However,
another very natural scenario in which voting blocs may occur, in fact an even
more appropriate one, is any legislature in which political parties may be formed.
If we want to explain party formation, we need to allow for diﬀerent parties to
exist. Starting with a set of individual legislators, parties would be each one of
the voting blocs that are formed.
Some models studying the incentives to party formation are grounded on
a distributive politics setting, where parties help agents to get a share of the
pie, as in Baron (1989). Jackson and Moselle (2002) attempt to model coalition
19and party formation with both distributive and ideological dimensions. Our
approach would try to explain party formation solely on the grounds of enhanced
probabilities of getting the desired ideological outcome.
We leave these and other developments for future research.
6A p p e n d i x
6.1 Proposition 1
Proof. Let s denote the size of the minority in the coalitional internal vote, S
t h es i z eo ft h em a j o r i t yi ns u c hv o t e ,t h u ss+S = N +1, let EUT
i (t) denote the
expected utility for agent i ∈ C given that the whole coalition C forms a voting
bloc with t as the internal voting rule and given that T is the number of votes
needed in the general election for alternative a to be implemented. Similarly let
EUT
i (∅) denote the expected utility for agent i ∈ C if the coalition does not










(N +1− 2k) ∗ Pr[s = k] ∗ Pr[minority is
rolled] ∗ Pr[rolling k votes alters outcome].
Given any t ∈ [1
2, N
N+1) and any proﬁle of types such that pi ∈ (0,1) for
all i in the society, if s =1then Pr[minority is rolled] is equal to one and all
the other terms in the expression are strictly positive. For any s ∈ [1, N
2 ] all
terms are weakly positive, thus the aggregated expected surplus in utility for
the coalition generated by the voting bloc is strictly positive.
Let Smdenote simple majority as internal voting rule for coalition C,a n dl e t
vr denote any other internal voting rule for coalition C. Under Sm,all the votes
of the coalition are always cast in favor of the position chosen by the majority of
the coalition, thus no other rule can give more votes to the position favored by
a majority of the coalition. Therefore, if for some voting behavior the outcome
in the general election depends on whether the coalition uses vr or Sm,i tm u s t
be that the outcome under Sm is the one favored by the majority, and under
vr the one favored by the minority. Let v ∈ {0,1}M+N+1 be a realization of the
preferences of all the agents in the society, where 0 represents a no preference
and 1 a yes preference. Let Pr(v) be the probability that the realization v
occurs, according to the vector of types of all agents. Let q(vr|v) denote the
probability that given preferences v, the outcome in the general election depends











This term is always non-negative and it is strictly positive for any rule vr that
with positive probability will bring about a diﬀerent outcome than Sm.
206.2 Proposition 2
Proof. Let T = M + N +1 .T h e n i f s o m e j/ ∈ C opposes alternative a,
alternative a will be rejected regardless of the votes of every other agent. In
this case the formation of a voting bloc by C does not aﬀect the utility of any
agent.
If all M agents not in C support alternative a and C forms no bloc, then a
is approved if and only if all members of C support a. If all M agents not in C
support alternative a and C forms a voting bloc with a t − majority internal
voting rule, then a is implemented if strictly more than t(N +1 )members in
C support a. Given that pi ∈ (0,1) ∀i ∈ C and given that the t − majority
internal voting rule for C is either simple majority or any supermajority, the
probability that more than t(N +1)members in C support a is strictly greater
than the probability that every member in C supports a. Thus, the expected
utility for any agent m not in C with pm > 0 is strictly greater if C forms a
voting bloc.
Let instead T = M+N
2 +1 . Then the sum of expected utilities for the whole
society is maximized without a voting bloc, because the maximal social welfare is
achieved by always implementing the wishes of the majority, as proved by Curtis
(1972). A voting bloc reduces the total social welfare by making minorities win.
Since the formation of a voting bloc increases the sum of expected utilities of
the members of the coalition, it must be that it decreases the sum of expected
utilities of the agents not in the coalition.
6.3 Claim from Assumption 2
Assumption 2: For all k ∈ [0, N
2 − 1] and for all i,j ∈ C, gij(N
2 + k) >g ij(N
2 −
k − 1).
We want to show: For all k ∈ [1, N
2 ] and for all i ∈ C, gi(N
2 +k) >g i(N
2 −k).
Proof. gij(x) is the distribution of a sum of N −1 independent Bernoulli trials,
each trial taking the type of a member of C\{i,j} as probability of success. The
sum of independent Bernoulli trials is a unimodal distribution, as shown by
Darroch (1964). Therefore, gij(N
2 +k−1) >g ij(N
2 −k) implies gij(N
2 +k−1) >
gij(N
2 − k − 1).
For any i,j, gi(N
2 + k) − gi(N




+ k − 1) + (1 − pj)gij(
N
2
+ k) − pjgij(
N
2




> (2pj − 1)gij(
N
2
+ k − 1) − (2pj − 1)gij(
N
2
− k − 1)
> (2pj − 1)[gij(
N
2
+ k − 1) − gij(
N
2
− k − 1)].
Since this is true for any i,j, and since by Assumption 2 at least two members
have a type over a half, then for any i this last expression is true for at least
one j with pj > 1
2. Then gi(N
2 + k) − gi(N
2 − k) > 0.
216.4 Lemma 1
Let A and B be two internal voting rules for coalition C. Let us deﬁne two
functions, which depend on the rules A and B, and the vector of types p−i:
αi(B,A,p−i)=Probability that, given that member i prefers yes, the out-
come in the general election is yes if the coalition uses rule B and no if it uses
rule A.
βi(B,A,p−i)=Probability that, given that member i prefers no, the out-
come in the general election is no if the coalition uses rule B and yes if it uses
rule A.
We will use these functions in most of the proofs in this Appendix. In Lemma
1, we want to show that EUh[t] − EUh[∅] − (EUl[t] − EUl[∅]) ≥ 0.
Proof. EUl[t] − EUl[∅]=
pl∗αl(t,∅,p −l)+(1−pl)∗βl(t,∅,p −l)−pl∗αl(∅,t,p −l)−(1−pl)∗βl(∅,t,p −l)
and similarly EUh[t] − EUh[∅]=
ph∗αh(t,∅,p −h)+(1−ph)∗βh(t,∅,p −h)−ph∗αh(∅,t,p −h)−(1−ph)∗βh(∅,t,p −h).
In Step 1 we show that
ph∗αh(t,∅,p −h)+(1−ph)∗βh(t,∅,p −h)−pl∗αl(t,∅,p −l)−(1−pl)∗βl(t,∅,p −l)
is positive. In Step 2, we show that
−ph∗αh(∅,t,p −h)−(1−ph)∗βh(∅,t,p −h)+pl∗αl(∅,t,p −l)+(1−pl)∗βl(∅,t,p −l)
is also positive, thus adding all the terms, EUh[t]−EUh[∅]−(EUl[t]−EUl[∅])
is also positive.
Step 1:
Let dxe denote the smallest integer equal or larger than x and similarly let







































































and omitting a very similar step we directly obtain that











which, since dtNe + b(1 − t)Nc = N, relabeling the counter in the summation
becomes:














































+ k) − glh(
N
2
− k − 1)]
which is positive by Assumption 2.
Step 2:





















































[(ph − pl)glh(k − 1)][F(
M + N
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which, relabeling once again, becomes































+ k) − glh(
N
2
− k − 1)]
which is also positive by Assumption 2.
It follows that EUh[t] − EUh[∅] − (EUl[t] − EUl[∅]) ≥ 0.
246.5 Lemma 2
To shorten the proofs of Propositions 3, 6 and 8 we introduce a second lemma:
Lemma 2 Given two internal voting rules A and B for coalition C, a member





βi(A,B,p−i)], where the functions αi and βi are as deﬁned in the proof of
Lemma 1.





Let simple majority be the general election rule. Then the formation of a voting
bloc by the coalition with t as the internal decision rule beneﬁts member l ∈ C
if and only if pl >p
t,∅
l (p−l).
Proof. By Lemma 2, member l is indiﬀerent between a voting bloc with a















































The derivative with respect to pl of the surplus for member l generated by the
voting bloc with internal voting rule t is equal to the denominator of p
t,∅
l (p−l),
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and 2F(M−N
2 − 1) = 2 − 2F(M+N
2 ).
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26Since dtNe + b(1 − t)Nc = N and t ≥ 1
2, if follows gl(dtNe) >g l(b(1 − t)Nc)
and thus the denominator is positive.
Therefore,
EUl[t] − EUl[∅] > 0 ⇐⇒ pl >p
t,∅
l .
Then, by Lemma 1, EUl[t] − EUl[∅] > 0= ⇒ EUi[t] − EUi[∅] > 0 for all
i ∈ C.
As a corollary note, if the internal voting rule is simple majority, then dtNe =
(1 − t)N = N











2 − k) − F(M−N









2 + k) − gl(N
2 − k)] ∗ [2F(M+N
2 ) − F(M
2 + k) − F(M
2 + k − 1)]
.
6.7 Proposition 4
Let V t ⊂ V be the subset of type proﬁles such that a t − majority rule is
beneﬁcial for C and let t0 = t + 1
N+1.
WTS: For any t ∈ [1
2, N−1
N+1),Vt is strictly contained in V t0
.













l (p−l) for any p−l.
Suppose pl = p
t,∅
l (p−l). Then EUl[t] − EUl[∅]=0
Let Sl|k denote the probability that member l is in the majority of the
coalition, given that the minority is of size k and let sl|k =1− Sl|k denote the
probability that member l is in the minority of the coalition, given that the
minority is of size k. Then EUl[t] − EUl[∅]=
b(1−t)Nc X
k=1
(Sl|k−sl|k)prob[Minority size= k]prob[rolling k votes alters outcome].
Note that Sl|k − sl|k is decreasing in k. The bigger the minority, the more
likely l is in it. Then, EUl[t]−EUl[∅]=0implies that for k = b(1 − t)Nc > 1,
(Sl|k − sl|k) < 0. Then:
b(1−t)Nc−1 X
k=1




(Sl|k−sl|k)prob[Minority size= k]prob[rolling k votes alters outcome]
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Since F(M
2 − k − 1) = [1 − F(M
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[r2k+1(1 − r) − r(1 − r)2k+1] −
1
N +2 k +2















Now we break this equation into M
2 diﬀerent equations, imposing that for each





[r2k+1(1 − r) − r(1 − r)2k+1] −
1
N +2 k +2











A solution to this system of equations (with just one unknown) also solves the
original equation. For each individual equation:
p =
(N − 2k)r2k+2 − (N +2 k +2 ) r(1 − r)2k+1
r(1 − r)[r2k − (1 − r)2k](N +2 k +2 )− (N − 2k)[(1 − r)2k+2 − r
2k+2]
28which, as N −→ ∞, converges to
r2k+2 − r(1 − r)2k+1






l (p−l)=r. Since by assumption pl <r ,this implies that for N
large enough, pl <p
Sm,∅
l (p−l) a n dt h e nm e m b e rl would be hurt if C forms a
voting bloc with simple majority.
6.9 Proposition 6
Proof. Let Out denote the internal voting rule for the coalition under which
N members form a voting bloc with simple majority and member l stays out of
the bloc and does not pool her vote with the rest of the coalition. By Lemma 2
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Relabeling the counters in the summations, we can write the denominator
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The diﬀerence in utility for agent l b e t w e e nt h ef o r m a t i o no fab l o cw i t h o u t
l and no bloc at all is
EUl[Out] − EUl[∅]=
= pl[αl(Out,∅,p −l) − αl(∅,Out,p −l)] + (1 − pl)[βl(Out,∅,p −l) − βl(∅,Out,p −l)].
The derivative of EUl[Out] − EUl[∅] with respect to pl coincides with the de-
nominator of the threshold p
Out,∅
l (p−l), which is positive. Therefore, for pl above
the threshold p
Out,∅
l (p−l), member l prefers the formation of a voting bloc in
which l does not participate better than not forming any bloc at all; whereas
for pl below p
Out,∅
l (p−l), member l prefers to form no bloc than to form a bloc
in which l does not participate.
6.10 Proposition 7
Let V be the set of type proﬁles (p1,p 2,...,pN+M+1) satisfying Assumptions 1
and 2. Let V t ⊂ V be the subset of type proﬁles such that a t − majority rule
is beneﬁcial for C,l e t(V t)C be its complement such that V t ∪ (V t)C ≡ V and
let V Out ⊂ V be the subset of type proﬁl e ss u c ht h a ta n" O p t - O u tf o rl"r u l e
is beneﬁcial for C. Then, for any M and for any 4 ≤ N ≤ M, (V t)C ∩ V Out is
not empty.
Proof. Suppose 4 ≤ N ≤ M, pl =( 1− δ) and pj =( 1− ε) ∀j ∈ C\{l}. Then:
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M + N
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As ε converges to zero,
gl(k)
gl(N−1) converges to zero for any k<N− 1 and






which is positive for a suﬃciently low δ, provided that f(M−N
2 ) > 0.
Then, there exist a δ>0 and ε>0 such that for all ε<ε, EUl[Out] −
EUl[∅] > 0.
Therefore, if 4 ≤ N ≤ M, and the types of all the members but l converge
to 1, member l with type pl =( 1− δ) will beneﬁt from a voting bloc with an
"Opt-Out for l" rule. Given that all the other members of C share a common
type, they would all beneﬁt from forming a voting bloc without l. Since p
t,∅
l (p−l)
converges to 1, member l would not beneﬁtf r o mat−majority internal voting
rule in a voting bloc that includes every member. It follows that if ε<ε, any
proﬁle of types in which pl =( 1− δ) and pj =( 1− ε) ∀j ∈ C\{l} is in V Out
but not in V t, thus V Out * V t.
If N>M ,then EUl[Sm]−EUl[Out]=2 gl(N
2 )[F(M+N
2 )−F(M
2 )] > 0, thus
thus V Out ⊂ V Sm. If N =2 , then Out coincides with ∅ and V Out is empty.
6.11 Proposition 8
Proof. By Lemma 2, member l will be indiﬀerent between participating in the









2 − 1) − F(M−N















2 −1) = F(M+N
2 )−F(M
2 ) and f(M+N
2 )=f(M−N
2 )
it follows that αl(Sm,Out,p−l)=βl(Sm,Out,p−l) and we can simplify the











































The advantage for member l of staying in, EUl[Sm] − EUl[Out]=
= pl[αl(Sm,Out,p −l)−al(Out,Sm,p−l)]+(1−pl)[βl(sm,Out,p −l)−βl(Out,Sm,p−l)].




2 + k) >g l(N
2 − k) for all k ∈ [1, N
2 ], the denominator and thus the
derivative are positive. Therefore, member l prefers to stay in if type pl is above
the threshold p
Sm,Out





Proof. The ﬁrst statement comes straightforward from Propositions 3 and 8.
For the second one, suppose pi = p ∀i ∈ C. Then all members beneﬁtf r o mt h e
formation of a voting bloc with simple majority: EUi[Sm] >E U i[∅] ∀i ∈ C.























− 1) − F(
M − N
2










For p ∈ (1/2,1) and any N,M :



























which letting α = f(M−N
2 ) and β = N!
N
2 ! N
2 ! is equal to:
α(1−p)pN − 1




is positive if and only if




















































which is less than one for N ∈ [4,M], provided that f(M−N
2 ) > 0.






=0 ;whereas if N>M ,α=0 .
If N =2 , then EUl[Out]=EUl[∅], thus EUl[Sm] >E U l[∅] implies
EUl[Sm] >E U l[Out].
If N>M ,then f(M+N
2 )=f(M−N
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